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When I was a student at the International Academy of Philosophy in
the Principality of Liechtenstein, I was helped to develop a desire to
investigate in philosophy not the shadows of things but the ‘things in
themselves’,  independent of how we think and speak about them.
Barry Smith drew my attention to the works of David Armstrong and
of Roman Ingarden and also mentioned a professor in the north of
Sweden, in Umeå. This way I came to read Armstrong’s books, In-
garden’s Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt and Ingvar Johansson’s
Ontological  Investigations.  This  strengthened  my commitment  to
study the things in themselves – and made it harder for me to make
sense of much of contemporary analytic philosophy. It took me a long
time to realise that I had been indulging a very special diet of philo-
sophical  literature  and  that  most  analytic  metaphysics  today  still
uses linguistic methods like the method of ontological commitment
and investigates  concepts  rather  than the  things and thus,  in  my
view, is looking at shadows only. When Ingvar and I were for a few
months working together at IFOMIS in Leipzig, we hardly ever dis-
cussed the many political and religious issues about which we prob-
ably  disagree,  but  instead  were  always  drawn  into  ontology  and
metaphysics, where I find Ingvar’s perceptiveness outstanding.
Ingvar, and much later I too, was greatly inspired by David Arm-
strong, especially by his book Universals from 1978. In this contribu-
tion I want to raise objections against a new view that Armstrong put
forward much later. In his article ‘Four Disputes about Properties’
(2005), Armstrong has argued that the properties of a thing are parts
of that thing and the predication of properties is necessary. In what
follows, after a general remark about Armstrong’s conception of on-
tology, I shall raise objections against this view and defend an altern-
ative account of the connection between particulars and their prop-
erties, involving a kind of ontological dependence which is different
from  Armstrong’s  necessary  connection  between  particulars  and
their properties.
According to Armstrong’s ontology there are particulars and prop-
erties. Properties are universals: if F is a universal and a and b are
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particulars that are F, then  a’s F-ness is numerically identical with
b’s F-ness. When Armstrong says ‘There are universals’ he does not
make a claim about the meanings of predicates, he does not answer
a question of semantics. Already in his early work on universals he
fought against the mistake of confusing universals with meanings: 
I  believe that the identification of  universals with meanings (connota-
tions, intensions) [...] has been a disaster for the theory of universals. A
thoroughgoing separation of the theory of universals from the theory of
the semantics of general terms is in fact required. (Armstrong 1978: xiv)
Armstrong’s reason for assuming universals  is  not  that predicates
cannot be replaced by, or defined in terms of, other types of expres-
sions. It is not that we are ‘ontologically committed’ to universals.
His aim is to describe what there is, and he holds that the resemb-
lance between two things consists  in there being a universal that
both things instantiate. His aim is not to analyze concepts and state-
ments but to describe the structure of reality independently of how
we ordinarily think or speak about it. He wants to name not truth
conditions but truthmakers. In contemporary philosophy, Armstrong
is the forerunner of metaphysics that is independent of semantics,
and not many have followed him. There is a great gulf between Arm-
strong and Ingvar on the one hand, and on the other hand philosoph-
ers who are used to doing metaphysics as a discipline more closely
related to semantics. Those from the other side of the gulf are in
danger to misunderstand some of Armstrong’s claims as claims about
statements although Armstrong intends them to be about their truth-
makers.
Armstrong rejects bundle theories, according to which things are
bundles of properties and hence consist just of properties. He holds
that properties are borne by substrata, by property bearers. Accord-
ing to his new view, the link between particular and universal is par-
tial identity. The properties of a thing are parts of that thing. He also
says that the particular and its universal ‘overlap’. This takes Arm-
strong to the view that predication is necessary. ‘Once one has iden-
tity, even if only partial identity, there will be found necessity.’ If a
thing loses one of its properties it thereby ceases to exist, it becomes
a different entity. Likewise the universal becomes a different entity.
Every thing has all of its properties necessarily.
It is Armstrong’s presupposition, I take it, that a thing has its parts
necessarily.  Given that  the properties  of  a thing are parts of  that
thing it follows that a thing has all of its properties necessarily, in the
sense that if it loses one it ceases to exist and becomes a different
thing, and if it had had different properties it would have been a dif-
ferent  thing.2  Likewise,  universals  are  necessarily  instantiated  as
they are. ‘Having just the instances it has is essential to the universal
being what it is’ (Armstrong 2005). I have four objections. 
1. Overlap
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Armstrong says that a particular and its universals ‘overlap’. Accord-
ing  to  Armstrong’s  conception  of  universals  (at  least  until  his  A
World of States of Affairs), if a and b are F, then a’s F-ness and b’s F-
ness are numerically identical. But then F is a part of a, and F has no
parts that are not part of a. The particular and its universal overlap,
but they do not properly overlap, they do not overlap in the ordinary
sense. This does not affect Armstrong’s claim that a thing has its
properties necessarily. But why does Armstrong hold that a universal
has its instances necessarily? The instances of a universal are not
parts of the universal. If b ceases to instantiate F, then F is less often
instantiated, but it does not lose a part. There is therefore no reason
to assume that F ceases to be and becomes a different entity – unless
Armstrong now gives up his view that a’s F-ness and b’s F-ness are
numerically identical. 
2. Mereological Essentialism
Armstrong assumes that  a thing has its  parts necessarily,  i.e.  if  a
whole loses one of its parts it thereby ceases to exist. This doctrine,
sometimes called mereological essentialism, has its defenders, but it
is neither uncontroversial nor without alternative. Contra mereolo-
gical essentialism one may hold that some things can survive the loss
or replacement of some of their parts. After all, we say that a car can
have one its door replaced or I can lose a finger or I (or my body) can
get a new kidney without ceasing to exist or becoming a different
thing. Things which, contra mereological  essentialism, can survive
the replacement of parts are sometimes called entia successiva (van
Inwagen 1991). 
Roderick Chisholm (1976: Appendix B and ch. III) proposed an al-
ternative to Armstrong’s view that things do not survive the loss of
parts. He says of entia successiva that they are ‘constituted’ by entit-
ies for which mereological essentialism is true. A tyre of my car was
replaced means (roughly): There was one thing, T1, which ceased to
exist when the tyre was replaced; there was another thing, T2, con-
taining the parts of T1 except a different tyre. Before the replace-
ment of the tyre my car was constituted by T1, after that by T2. My
car survived the replacement of the tyre, but T1 did not. Chisholm
thus provides a method to translate sentences apparently about cars
that can change parts into sentences about cars that cease to exist
when they lose parts. For him there are  entia successiva, but they
can be reduced to more basic entities for which mereological essen-
tialism is true. 
Roman Ingarden (1965: §43), on the other hand, argues that indi-
vidual things (substances), for which mereological essentialism is not
true, are more basic than wholes, for which mereological essential-
ism is true. A thing, e.g. a table, can also be taken as, or conceptual-
ized, as a whole. The scheme of a whole is then ‘thrown over’ the
thing (Ingarden 1965: 117). The whole ceases to exist if it loses a
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part,  but a thing can survive the loss of a property or a part (al-
though strictly speaking only wholes but not things have parts). 
My own view is that we can form the concepts of part and whole in
different  ways.  We  can  stipulate  that  a  whole  that  loses  a  part
thereby  ceases  to  exist.  Ordinarily,  however,  if  we  ask  questions
about the diachronic identity of a thing with parts, we do so on the
background of a certain sortal concept under which the thing is sub-
sumed.  The  sortal  concept  provides  the  conditions  of  diachronic
identity of the thing. Whether the loss of a certain part means the
end of the thing depends on the sortal concept. A violin, for example,
does not become a different violin and does not cease to exist if the
fingerboard is renewed. 
At any rate, if a theory entails that a violin ceases to exist if it loses
a part, then that counts strongly against that theory, because that
seems just false and there is no discovery that would convince us
otherwise.  Likewise,  if  a  theory  entails,  as  Armstrong’s  new view
does, that a violin becomes a different violin if it loses a property,
then that counts strongly against that theory. 
3. Essential Properties 
My view that conditions of diachronic identity are provided by sortal
concepts leads me to relativism about necessary (or ‘essential’) prop-
erties. Whether the loss of a certain property entails the end of the
existence of the thing does not depend on the thing in itself but on
the sortal concept under which the thing is subsumed. A traditional
substance ontologist (e.g. Roman Ingarden) denies this because he
holds that the property bearer of a thing is an exemplification of a
kind universal. A thing continues to exist as long as its kinded prop-
erty bearer continues to exist. What this kind is and on which proper-
ties  the  property  bearer  is  dependent  (the  ‘essential  properties’)
does not depend on the sortal concept; rather, it is something to be
discovered about the thing in itself. 
It seems to me that Armstrong’s ontology leads to relativism about
essential properties too. He argues that all monadic universals are
properties and that there are no kind universals (which he calls ‘sub-
stantival universals’) irreducible to conjunctions of properties (Arm-
strong 1978: 61–67). It seems to follow that it is nothing to be dis-
covered about the thing in itself what the kind is which is relevant
for the conditions of diachronic identity of the thing; that is, the kind
K such that it is true to say that the thing ceased to exist if and only
if it is not a K anymore. It seems to me that what the conditions of
diachronic identity are then depends on under which sortal concept
the thing is subsumed, and there are several sortal concepts under
which the thing can be subsumed. The end of the existence of a thing
with parts is ontologically just a change in which properties are in-
stantiated where. It  differs from other such changes only because
through it a certain sortal concept does not apply anymore. 
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Armstrong, however, is not a relativist about essential properties
(as he has confirmed in conversation). He holds that all ‘predication
of properties is necessary’ in the sense that if a particular lacked a
property which it actually has, then it would have been a different
particular. So my objection here is that Armstrong’s ontology leads to
relativism about necessary properties and that he therefore should
not hold that any, let alone all, predication of properties is necessary.
There is no ontological fact of the matter whether the loss of a cer-
tain property entails the end of the existence of the thing. 
4. Ontological Glue
Armstrong’s  main  argument  against  bundle  theories  is  that  ‘they
have great difficulty with the metaphysics of the uniting principle or
principles of bundling’ (Armstrong 2005). They fail to provide the on-
tological glue holding the bundle together. Armstrong’s alternative is
that the link between particular and universal is partial identity. I
shall  now raise an objection against Armstrong’s view and, in the
light of this objection, defend a solution of the gluing problem that is
also available to the bundle theorist. 
Armstrong wants to solve the gluing problem with his new view.
The properties of a thing are parts of it, and if it loses a property it
thereby  ceases  to  exist.  The  thing  has  its  properties  necessarily.
Therefore  the  thing  cannot  lose  properties  and  has  in  this  sense
unity, the gluing problem is thus solved. The link between particular
and universal is partial identity and not a genuine relation of com-
presence or instantiation, the acceptance of which would lead to a
regress. 
I have two objections against this solution. First, according to clas-
sical extensional mereology, a whole, or mereological sum, continues
to exist as long as all its parts continue to exist. Consider a thing
which, according to Armstrong’s new view, is a whole of which the
properties of the thing are parts. According to Armstrong’s theory of
universals (Armstrong 1978 and 1997), if a thing loses a property the
property does not thereby cease to exist (at least as long as it is in-
stantiated by other things). So the whole consisting of the properties
of a thing is not destroyed by the thing losing a property. It continues
to exist even if the properties that are parts of it are not all instanti-
ated by the thing anymore. According to Armstrong’s new view the
link between a particular and its universals is the same as, and noth-
ing more than, the link between a whole and its parts. But the link
between a  particular  and one  of  its  universals  can be  broken up
whilst the link between the whole and its parts, one of which is the
universal, continues to hold. With tropes the situation would be dif-
ferent, but with universals as parts of things Armstrong’s solution
does not seem to work.
Of course, intuitively we would say that if a violin is taken apart
then the whole ceases to exist, or that if a leg is cut off a table the
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table loses a part and the leg is no longer a part of the table. That is
so because, against classical extensional mereology, we often mean
by a whole something whose parts are somehow connected. We usu-
ally use a concept of a whole according to which the whole loses a
part if a certain relation between the part and the rest of the whole
ceases to hold; e.g. if the part ceases to be physically connected to
the rest of the whole, i.e. if it is cut off. But such a concept of a whole
would not help Armstrong because it would require an additional re-
lation connecting the parts. Armstrong would have to use a concept
of a whole according to which a thing is a whole that has the proper-
ties of the thing as parts and that loses a property as part if the thing
ceases to instantiate the property. But accepting a relation of instan-
tiation besides the relation of being a part is exactly what Armstrong
wants to avoid. 
Secondly, I suggest that necessary predication does not glue a uni-
versal to a particular in the required way. The trouble is that the de-
pendence relation that Armstrong uses is no glue. Let me explain by
sketching Edmund Husserl’s und Roman Ingarden’s account of the
unity of a thing, which I think succeeds where Armstrong’s new view
does not succeed. Husserl and Ingarden, like Armstrong, using the
concept of a part in a wide sense, take the properties of a thing to be
parts of the thing. Husserl and Ingarden, however, take properties to
be particulars (‘Momente’), ‘tropes’ as they are called today. (They
believe that there are universals as well as tropes, tropes being ex-
emplifications of universals.) However, unlike some modern defend-
ers of tropes (e.g. Campbell 1990), they do not take them to be inde-
pendent entities. They are not little nuggets. Husserl says that the
properties of a thing are intimately united, they penetrate each oth-
er, such that it is impossible (which for Husserl and Ingarden means
synthetically impossible, not analytically or logically impossible) that
one exists without being together with other properties in the unity
of  a  thing.  Husserl  and  Ingarden  call  properties
“seinsunselbständig”, i.e. self-insufficient entities. Tropes cannot ex-
ist on their own. Self-insufficiency is a kind of ontological depend-
ence, which Ingvar develops carefully in chapter 8 of his Ontological
Investigations. Husserl distinguishes in this sense ‘concrete parts’ of
a thing, which can be chopped off, from ‘abstract parts’ of a thing,
e.g. a thing’s properties, which cannot be chopped off. The proper-
ties of a thing are mutually dependent on each other so that they
cannot be chopped off (although some can be replaced by new prop-
erties). 
Now this kind of ontological dependence functions as ontological
glue because it prevents a thing from falling apart. In Armstrong’s
new view, however, there is nothing that prevents a thing from falling
apart. It says that if a thing falls apart it becomes a different thing,
but it leaves open the possibility of the thing falling apart. I therefore
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suggest that bundle theories can be defended against Armstrong’s
criticism that they cannot explain the unity of a thing, and that Arm-
strong’s own explanation of the unity of a thing is objectionable.
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